

Message Text

SECRET

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SUBJECT: AMB JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 12, 1973

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMB JOHNSON AT THE
APRIL 12, 1973 SALT MEETING.

MR. MINISTER,

I

IN YOUR STATEMENT OF APRIL 10, YOU ONCE AGAIN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS A PROVISION ON WHAT HAS BEEN TERMED NON- TRANSFER; SUCH A PROVISION WOULD BE INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY.

THE US DELEGATION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE CONCEPT OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. AS YOU CORRECTLY POINTED OUT ON DEC 15, 1972, MR. MINISTER, INTEREST IN OBSERVING THIS PRINCIPLE DOES NOT LIE WITH ONE SIDE ONLY.

NON- TRANSFER IS NOT A NEW SUBJECT TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIDES RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR SUCH A PROVISION IN THE ABM TREATY. A

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MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION APPROPRIATE TO THE ABM QUESTION WAS WORKED OUT AND IS EMBODIED IN ART IX OF THE TREATY. AT THAT TIME, THE US SIDE, WHILE RECOGNIZING THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR A COR-

RESPONDING PROVISION IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ALSO REALIZED THAT THE SITUATION WOULD BE FAR MORE COMPLEX ON THE OFFENSIVE SIDE. THEREFORE, ON APRIL 18, 1972, THE USDEL MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

" IN REGARD TO THIS ART IX, I HAVE A BRIEF AND I BELIEVE SELF-EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO MAKE. THE US SIDE WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ARTICLE DO NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR WHATEVER PROVISION MAY BE CONSIDERED FOR A TREATY ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE QUESTION OF TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS A FAR MORE COMPLEX ISSUE, WHICH MAY REQUIRE A DIFFERENT SOLUTION."

AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, MANY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES REMAIN UNSETTLED. THEREFORE, THE US SIDE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CONSIDER A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON NON- TRANSFER UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS.

II

THE SOVIET DEL HAS NOW CALLED UNACCEPTABLE THE US PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL LEVELS FOR AN AGGREGATE OF THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY IN ISOLATION FROM EACH OTHER, BUT RATHER AS A PACKAGE PROVIDING FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN ADDITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL LEVELS FOR AN AGGREGATE OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, WE HAVE PROPOSED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL SUB- LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS AND ON THE AGGREGATE THROW- WEIGHT OF THE ICBM FORCES OF EACH SIDE. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE THREE ELEMENTS WOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE MUTUAL SECURITY, WHICH WOULD BE VERIFIABLE AND WHICH WOULD PROVIDE NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE.

IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NOW REJECTED THE US PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH BOTH EQUAL CEILINGS FOR THE AGGREGATE OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND EQUAL CEILINGS FOR ICBM THROW- WEIGHT, MUST I ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS SERIOUSLY HOLDING TO A POSITION CONTAINING THE GRAVE INEQUALITIES IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS TO WHICH I CALLED ATTENTION IN MY STATEMENT OF APRIL 3?

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I HAD HOPED THAT MY ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE SOVIET POSITION WOULD
PROVE TO BE INACCURATE. AS YOU R
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